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Dr. Joel Filartiga and his daughter Dolly Filartiga, citizens of Paraguay living in the United
States,’ brought a civil action in United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
against Americo Norbeto Pena-Irala (Pena), also a citizen of Paraguay, for wrongfully causing
the death of Dr. Filartiga’s son, Joelito, in Paraguay in 1976. Although none of the parties were
citizens of the United States and the alleged tort occurred in Paraguay, the Filartigas contended that
the court’s subject matter jurisdiction was properly based upon the Alien Tort Statute. While the
Filartiga decision is bound to have broad-ranged consequences, it does not open the “floodgates.”
The court here was faced with a clear mandate from the facts to find jurisdiction under the Alien
Tort Statute in face of the Filartigas’ claim of state sanctioned torture.
RECENT DEVELOPMENT
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789-POLITICAL TORTURE PRO-
VIDES FEDERAL JURISDICTION UNDER THE STATUTE-Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
Dr. Joel Filartiga and his daughter Dolly Filartiga, citizens of
Paraguay living in the United States,' brought a civil action in
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
against Americo Norbeto Pena-Irala (Pena), also a citizen of
Paraguay,2 for wrongfully causing the death of Dr. Filartiga's son,
Joelito, in Paraguay in 1976. 3 Pena, who at that time was the In-
spector General of Police in Asuncion, is alleged to have kidnapped
and fatally tortured Joelito in retaliation for Dr. Filartiga's opposi-
tion to the government of President Alfredo Stroessner.4
Although none of the parties were citizens of the United States
and the alleged tort occurred in Paraguay, the Filartigas contended
that the court's subject matter jurisdiction was properly based upon
the Alien Tort Statute. 5 This "rarely-invoked"6 statute provides
that, "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
1. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). Dolly Filartiga
has since applied for permanent political asylum. Id.
2. Pena had entered the United States in 1978 under a visitor's visa. At the
time he was served with the complaint in this action, Pena was being held in the
Brooklyn Detention Center pending deportation by the Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service tor overstaying that visa. Id. at 878-79.
3. Dolly Filartiga claims that she was brought to Pena's house and shown the
badly brutalized body of her brother. When she fled horrified from the house, Pena
is alleged to have pursued her shouting, "Here you have what you have been look-
ing for for so long and what you deserve. Now shut up." Id. at 878.
4. Id. During the course of a criminal action brought by Dr. Filartiga against
Pena in Paraguay in 1976, another man claimed he had killed Joelito in the heat of
passion after allegedly finding Joelito committing an act of adultery with his wife.
Despite this, Dolly Filartiga claims that she can produce evidence of three inde-
pendent autopsies which show that Joelito died as a result of professional torture. Id.
5. Id. at 880.
6. Id. at 878. See also IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)
(Friendly, J.) ("This old but little used section is a kind of legal Lohengrin; although
it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act ... no one seems to know whence it
came."). See generally Humphrey, A Legal Lohengrin: Federal Jurisdiction Under
the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, 14 U.S.F. L. REV. 105 (1979).
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law of nations or a treaty of the United States."-7 As the Filartigas
did not allege that their cause of action arose directly under a
treaty, the jurisdictional issue was whether the alleged conduct vio-
lated the law of nations.'
After hearing argument on Pena's motions to dismiss the com-
plaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and forum non
conveniens,9 Judge Nickerson dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction, "constru[ing] narrowly 'the law of nations', as em-
ployed in [the Alien Tort Statute], as excluding that law which gov-
erns a state's treatment of its own citizens."' 0
On appeal from the order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, after reviewing numerous affidavits of inter-
national legal scholars" and various international documents,' 2 re-
versed the district court and held that "deliberate torture perpe-
trated under color of official authority violates universally accepted
norms of the international law of human rights, regardless of the
nationality of the parties,"' 3 and that the Alien Tort Statute pro-
vides federal subject matter jurisdiction whenever the alleged per-
petrator is found and served with process within the United
States.1
4
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1976); see notes 15-23 infra and accompanying text.
8. 630 F.2d at 880.
9. Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the competence of a court to hear only
those cases which are in the judicial power as defined by the Constitution See gener-
ally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3522 (1975). Forum non conveniens refers to the doctrine which allows that, upon
motion by the defendant, a court may dismiss an action of which it has both personal
and subject matter jurisdiction if there exists "another forum so much more conven-
ient for the parties and the courts that the plaintiff's privilege of choosing his forum
is outweighed." C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 185 (3d ed. 1976).
10. 630 F.2d at 880.
11. Id. at 879 n.4. Professors Richard Falk of Princeton University, Thomas
Franck of New York University, Richard Lillich of the University of Virginia School
of Law, and Myres MacDougal formerly of Yale Law School all concurred that tor-
ture violates international law.
12. Id. at 881. Specifically the court looked at the Charter of the United Na-
tions, 59 Stat. 1033, 1 U.N.T.S. xvi (1945); the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A.Res. 217(III)(A) U.N. Doc. A/C.3/306 (1948); and the Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. 1034 (1975).
13. Id. at 878.
14. Id. See generally Kaufman, A Legal Remedy for International Torture?
N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1980, §6 (magazine), at 44. Judge Kaufman wrote the panel's
unanimous opinion in Filartiga. 630 F.2d at 877.
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I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND PRIOR CASE LAW
The Alien Tort Statute, as now codified, 15 has not undergone
any substantial change since its adoption as section 9 of the Judici-
ary Act of 1789.16 Although the source of the statute is somewhat
of a mystery, 1 7 it has been found to be one of a group of provisions
"reflecting a concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with
foreign nations and indicating a desire to give matters of interna-
tional significance to the jurisdiction of federal institutions.' 18
Prior to Filartiga, only one court found jurisdiction expressly
under the Alien Tort Statute. In Abdul-Rahman Omar Adra v.
Clift, 19 a Lebanese citizen seeking custody pursuant to a Lebanese
divorce decree brought suit against his former wife for the wrong-
ful detention of their daughter. The court in Clift found the requi-
site international law violation in the fact that the defendant trans-
ported the child from country to country under a false passport. 20
It should be noted that the international law violation in Clift was
ancillary to the actual tort of wrongfully detaining the child. 21
In the remaining cases construing the Alien Tort Statute, the
courts generally have found jurisdiction to be lacking.22 The
threshold problem has been for plaintiffs to show a violation of the
law of nations. 23
This difficulty has its source in two aspects of the courts' ef-
forts to deal with international law in the context of the statute.
15. U.S.C. §1350 (1976).
16. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789).
17. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975); note 6 supra.
18. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1963).
19. 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961). See also Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810
(D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607) (Alien Tort Statute afforded an alternative basis for juris-
diction of suit brought under a treaty to recover slaves taken on the high seas).
20. The child was a Lebanese citizen but was included under her mother's
Iraqi passport, thereby concealing the child's full name and nationality. 195 F. Supp.
at 861.
21. Although the Filartiga court appears to read the statute as requiring that
the tort itself be the international law violation, it cites the Clift case, noting the dis-
tinction, but does not comment. 630 F.2d at 887 n.21. If the Clift case was rightly
decided, then it would appear that this may be an alternative basis for finding juris-
diction.
22. See, e.g,, Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978); Benjamins
v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978); IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519
F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973).
23. 630 F.2d at 887.
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First, in the absence of a treaty, courts have required that there be
a nearly unanimous consent in the traditional sources of interna-
tional law that a certain standard of conduct be recognized as a
substantive international legal principle. 24
Thus, for example, in Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 25 a child cus-
tody case arising out of the Vietnam "babylift," the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit found jurisdiction lacking as its "research
did not disclose in the traditional sources of 'the law of nations,' or
private international law, a universal or generally accepted substan-
tive rule or principle"2 6 dealing with child custody. Similarly, the
second circuit in Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Union2 7 de-
clined jurisdiction over an action brought by a Dutch shipping
company for damages resulting from the alleged denial of its
"right" under international law to have free access to port because
of a labor union's boycott, by finding that such access was merely a
rule of comity. 28
The second aspect of the difficulty in sustaining jurisdiction
under the statute has been the courts' characterization of interna-
24. The United States Supreme Court has stated that, in the absence of a treaty,
the law of nations may be ascertained in the "customs and usages of civilized na-
tions, and as evidence of these, [in] the works of jurists and commentators, who by
years of labor, research and experience, have made themselves peculiarly well ac-
quainted with the subjects of which they treat." The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,
700 (1900). See also United States v. Smith, U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-161 (1820). Fur-
thermore, the Court has observed that for a rule or standard of conduct to become a
rule of substantive international law, this investigation into the "customs and usages
of civilized nations" should disclose a "general assent" on the part of nations that it
be so. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 694. As stated by the Filartiga court, "[ilt is
only where the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual,
and not merely several, concern, by means of express international accords, that a
wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation within the mean-
ing of the statute." 630 F.2d at 888.
25. 586 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1978).
26. Id. at 629. But cf. Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 n.13
(9th Cir. 1975). The court in this "babylift" case stated that "the illegal seizure, re-
moval and detention of an alien against his will in a foreign country would appear to
be a tort . . . and it may be a tort in violation of the 'law of nations.' " Id. at 1201
n.13. The court declined to reach the Alien Tort Statute on the ground of inadequate
briefing and because plaintiffs had not joined as defendants the adoption agencies
which placed the children. Id.
27. 278 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1960).
28. Id. at 52. See also Benjamins v. British European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979) (jurisdiction declined in an action
brought by a Dutch citizen for the wrongful death of his wife in an air crash alleg-
edly caused by the negligence of defendant; the court finding that the law of nations
did not prohibit air crashes).
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tional law as applying solely to the conduct of nations vis-a-vis each
other. In Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder,29 the District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania defined a violation of inter-
national law as "a violation by one or more individuals of those
standards, rules or customs (a) affecting the relationship between
an individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for
their common good and/or in dealings inter se."30 In I.I.T. v.
Vencap, Ltd. 31 the second circuit, adopting the Lopes definition,
found that while every municipal legal system may prohibit fraud,
conversion and corporate waste, such prohibitions did not govern
nations in their dealings inter se.3 2 Also relying on the Lopes defi-
nition, the seventh circuit rejected the argument that fraud was
considered immoral and unlawful by all nations, and thus was a vi-
olation of international law.3 3
Further, in Dreyfus v. von Finck,3 4 another second circuit de-
cision construing the Statute, the court added in dictum another
limitation to what conduct would be considered in violation of the
law of nations. After finding that it had no jurisdiction under the
Lopes definition to hear the claims of a one-time German citizen3 5
against West German authorities for damages resulting from the
forced sale of property during the Nazi regime, the court stated
that "violations of international law do not occur when the
aggreived parties are nationals of the acting state."3 6
II. FILARTIGA v. PENA-IRALA: TORTURE AS
A VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
In Filartiga the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found
that official torture violated universal principles of international
29. 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
30. Id. at 297. In this case the district court refused jurisdiction of an action
brought by a seaman against the defendant shipowner for failing to provide a safe
place to work and for unseaworthiness of his vessel. Id. at 295. The Court found that
the doctrine of unseaworthiness was merely an American concept. Id. See also
Damaskinos v. Societa Navigacion Interamericana, S.A., 255 F. Supp. 919 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
31. 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
32. Id. at 1018.
33. Abiodun v. Martin Oil Serv., Inc., 475 F.2d 142, 145 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 866 (1973). See also Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324,
328 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
34. 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
35. Id. at 26. At the time of suit, the plaintiff was a Swiss citizen. Id.
36. Id. at 31.
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law, 'regardless of the nationality of the parties." 37 Therefore,
when personal service is made by an alien in the United States
upon the alleged torturer, the Alien Tort Statute provides federal
jurisdiction. 38
Recognizing torture as a human rights issue, 39 the court in
Filartiga first examined the Charter of the United Nations 40 for the
broad proposition that nations have an obligation under interna-
tional law to respect human rights. 41 Noting that "although there is
no universal agreement as to the precise extent of the 'human
rights and fundamental freedoms' guaranteed to all by the Char-
ter," the court found it sufficiently clear that these guarantees in-
clude the right not to be subjected to torture. 42 As evidence of this
the court then looked at the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 43 wherein Article 5 provides that "no one shall be sub-
jected to torture ..... 44 The court noted further that this prohibi-
tion against torture as "evidenced and defined" 45 by the Universal
Declaration "has become part of customary international law." 46
In finding that the prohibition against torture has become part
of international law, the court observed that this prohibition was
"clear and unambiguous, and admits of no distinction between
aliens and citizens."4 7 Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit expressly rejected as being "clearly out of tune with the
current usage and practice of international law,"4 8 its own four year
old dictum in Dreyfus v. von Finck49 that no international law vio-
37. 630 F.2d at 878.
38. id.
39. Id. at 881.
40. 59 Stat. 1033, 1 U.N.T.S. xvi (1945).
41. 630 F.2d at 881. The court specifically looked at Article 55 which provides
that "the United Nations shall promote . . . universal respect for, and observance of,
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language or religion." U.N. CHARTER art. 55; and art. 56 which provides, "All mem-
bers pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Or-
ganization for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55." U.N. CHAR-
TER art. 56.
42. 630 F.2d at 882.
43. G.A. Res. 217(III)(A), U.N. Doc. A/C.3/306 (1948).
44. Id. at art. 5.
45. 630 F.2d at 882.
46. Id.
47. Id at 884.
48. Id.
49. 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
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lation arises when the injured party is a national of the acting state.
Rather, the court found that "the treaties and accords cited above,
as well as the express foreign policy of our own government, all
make it clear that international law confers fundamental rights on
all people vis-a-vis their own governments." 50
While the court was able to find that official torture perpe-
trated against an individual reached the level of an international
law violation, it did not, however, reject the Lopes definition of an
international law violation as being a violation of those rules of con-
duct which govern nations dealing inter se. 51 On the contrary, the
court made it clear that it was not for the courts "to prejudge the
scope of the issues that the nations of the world may deem impor-
tant to their interrelationship, and thus to their common good." 52
In the case of torture "the nations have made it their business,
both through international and unilateral action, to be concerned
with domestic human rights violations of this magnitude."53 Thus
the court concluded, "the case before us . . . falls within the Lopes
rule. " 5 4
III. OTHER POSSIBLE ACTIONS UNDER
THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
It is clear from the Filartiga decision that it is the fact that
Pena was acting under color of official authority which rendered his
act of torture an international law violation. 55 Although the Fil-
artigas did not name Paraguay as a defendant, the violation of in-
ternational law occurred as a result of the breach of the obligation
owed by Paraguay to respect the internationally recognized human
rights of its citizen. 56 Nevertheless, international law has recog-
50. 630 F.2d 884-85. Particularly relevant for the court in its discussion of tor-
ture was the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) 91, U.N. Doc. A/1034'(1975),
which the court cites in full. 630 F.2d at 882 n.11.
51. 630 F.2d at 888.
52. Id.
53. Id at 889.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 878. "We have been directed to no assertion by any contemporary
state of a right to torture its own or another nation's citizens." Id. at 884 (emphasis
added).
56. See id. at 884. Accordingly, the court did not discuss the question of the li-
ability of Paraguay for the act of its agent. It is beyond dispute that a state or other
entity can only act through its agents. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
1980]
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nized individual liability for acts committed by public officials in
the discharge of their duties. 57
Although it has been said that the U.N. Charter and the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights authoritatively define "the
rights of man,"5 8 as the Filartiga court notes, these fundamental
rights provisions "will be a subject for continuing refinement and
elaboration." 5 9 There are, however, recognized "standards below
which no government can fall without offending fundamental values
-such as genocide, officially tolerated torture, mass imprisonment
or murder, or comprehensive denials of basic rights to racial, reli-
gious, political or ethnic groups." 60 Thus, to the extent to which
(1886). For a thorough discussion of the responsibility of a state for the acts of its
agents, see C. EAGLETON, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1928).
57. Generally these acts have been termed international "crimes" and thus the
liability has been criminal. See Draft Code of Offenses Against The Peace and Secu-
rity of Mankind, [1951] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 133, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER. A/
1951.
58. Address by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to the Organization of Amer-
ican States, reprinted in Human Rights Issues at the Sixth Regular Session of the
Organization of American States General Assembly: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on International Organizations of the House Comm. on International Relations,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kissinger]. See also LIBRARY OF
CONGRESS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND NATIONAL DEFENSE DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICES, HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES AND
THE U.S. RESPONSE (1978) [hereinafter cited as HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS].
59. 630 F.2d at 885. The Congress and the Carter Administration have
pointed to three elements as compromising "internationally recognized human rights":
First, there is the right to be free from government violation of the person.
Such violations include torture, cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment or
punishment, and arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. And they include a denial
of a fair public trial, and invasion of the home.
Second, there is the right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food,
shelter, health care, and education. We recognize that the fulfillment of this
right will depend, in part, upon the stage of a nation's economic develop-
ment. But we also know that this right can be violated by a government's ac-
tion or inaction-for example, through corrupt official processes which divert
resources to an elite at the expense of the needy, or through indifference to
the plight of the poor.
Third, there is the right to enjoy civil and political liberties-freedom of
thought; of religion; of assembly; freedom of speech and freedom of the
press; freedom of movement both within and outside one's own country;
freedom to take part in government.
HUMAN RIGHTS CONDITIONS, supra note 58, at 8-9.
60. Kissinger, supra note 58, at 19. The argument has been advanced in public
international law that there is a class of principles which no government may in-
fringe on in any way. This concept is known as the doctrine ofjus cogens. It has
been defined as "a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
ALIEN TORT CLAIMS
such actions constitute torts, as in the case of torture, it would ap-
pear that the statute would provide jurisdiction for purposes of
civil liability. 6 '
Outside the area of governmental abuse of human rights, it
has been recognized that certain actions by individuals are of such
a nature as to be of international significance. 62 Such actions might
include "terroristic [sic] activities, assassinations of heads of states,
counterfeiting foreign currencies, the slave trade, and traffic in nar-
cotics ...... 63 Although such activities are essentially criminal in
nature, 64 in so far as they create a tort liability to a particular plain-
tiff, the Alien Tort Statute should apply.
CONCLUSION
While the Filartiga decision is bound to have broad-ranged
consequences, it does not open the "floodgates." The court here was
faced with a clear mandate from the facts to find jurisdiction under
the Alien Tort Statute in face of the Filartigas' claim of state sanc-
tioned torture.
States as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 53, G.A. Conf. 39/27, re-
printed in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 679, 699 (1969). "The least controversial examples
of the class are the prohibition of aggressive war, the law of genocide, the principle
of racial nondiscrimination, crimes against humanity, and the rules prohibiting trade
in slaves and piracy." I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
500 (2d ed. 1973). See also Schwelb, Some Aspects of International Jus Cogens as
Formulated by the International Law Commission, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 946, 951
(1967).
61. Racial discrimination is not itself a traditional tort, unless it is some form of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS §49 (4th ed. 1971), the conduct has been so uniformly denounced that "those
who use violence against national, racial, or religious minorities should be consid-
ered 'violators of the law of nations."' P. JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 183
(1968).
In this regard, the doctrine of "abuse of rights" should be mentioned. The gist of
the doctrine is that as the community confers legal rights upon individuals, it cannot
tolerate their antisocial use and, the interest of the community is adversely affected
when the exercise of a hitherto legal right degenerates into an abuse of rights. See
generally H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COM-
MUNITY 286-88 (1966). For the prohibition of abuse of rights as the basis for the law
of torts, see id. at 295-97.
62. See P. JESSUP, supra note 61, at 178; C. EAGLETON, supra note 56, at 41.
63. P. JESSUP, supra note 61, at 178. See also Draft Code of Offenses Against
the Peace and Security of Mankind, [19511 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 134, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER. A/1951.
64. See note 56 supra.
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In its recognition that there exists under international law a
body of fundamental rights, and by expressing a willingness to re-
dress violations of these rights where there is a clear standard for
guidance, the Filartiga court clearly emphasizes the United States
concern for human rights.6 5 The decision leaves unanswered many
legal questions, 66 but by opening federal courts to an alien for
claims of this nature it represents a step forward in the administra-
tion of international justice.6 7
Frank A. Russo
65. One commentator has gone so far as to say:
[t]he United States is the dominant law-oriented state. As a result, it pos-
sesses a special responsibility that can only be discharged by a self-
conscious realization of its long-term interests in the development of a more
stable world order. The use of domestic courts [to apply substantive princi-
ples of international law when an effective consensus of states favors the im-
plementation of the rule] provides a symbolic means for the promotion of
these interests.
R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
12-13 (1964).
66. See Kaufman, supra note 14, at 52:
The Court of Appeals did not . . . determine whether Pena was in fact
liable to the Filartigas, nor did it decide what nation's law would be applied
to determine Pena's liability. These issues will be decided when the case is
heard in the lower court. The hearing of such civil suits will raise difficult
issues for the courts, and for the plaintiffs, as well. For instance, much of the
evidence and many of the witnesses will be overseas. And courts will have
to determine whether statutes of limitations will serve as a bar.
Moreover, it is not clear that the survivors of someone killed by an act of torture
have a claim under international law as most wrongful death actions are creat*ures of
statute in municipal law. See generally W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS §§ 126, 127 (4th
ed. 1971). See also Declaration on the Protection of All Persons-From Being Sub-
jected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34), 91, at art. 11, which
vests the right to recover in the victim.
67. N.Y. Times, Aug. 20, 1980, at A18, col. 1. See also Klement, Foreign Vic-
tims and U.S. Forums, Nat'l L. J., Oct. 13, 1980, at 1, col. 4.
